Division of Music into Speculative and Practical; by Which the Difference Between the Musician and the Singer Is Established

Speculative and Practical Music

In Music there occurs what is used to occur in some of the other sciences: for dividing itself into two parts, the one is called Theoretic or Speculative, and the other Practical. That whose end consists in the knowledge alone of the truth of things understood by the intellect — which is proper to every science — is called Speculative; the other, which depends solely on operation, is named Practical. The first, as Ptolemy holds, was discovered for the increase of knowledge — for by its means we can find new things and give them augmentation. But the Practical is solely for operating: as designing, describing, and fabricating with the hands the things that arise. This latter submits to the first in no other way than appetite submits to reason — and rightly so: for every art and every science naturally holds the reason by which one operates to be more noble than the operation itself. Whence, having from the soul our knowledge and from the Body, as its minister, our operation, it is manifest that the soul, surpassing and exceeding the body in nobility as regards operations, is also more noble — all the more so in that if the hands did not perform what reason commands them, they would labor in vain and without any fruit. So that there is no doubt that in the science of Music the knowledge of reason is more worthy than the operation.

The Necessary Bond Between Speculation and Practice

And although speculation by itself has no need of operation, nonetheless the speculative man cannot produce in act anything he has newly discovered without the help of the craftsman or of the instrument — for such speculation, even if it were not vain, would seem nonetheless without fruit when it is not reduced to its ultimate end, which consists in the exercise of natural and artificial instruments, by means of which it comes to achieve it. Just as likewise the craftsman without the aid of reason could never bring his work to any perfection. And for this reason in Music — considering it in its ultimate perfection — these two parts are so conjoined together that for the reasons given they cannot be separated one from the other.

The Difference Between the Musician and the Practitioner

And if we were nonetheless to separate them, from this we shall know the Speculative to differ from the Practical: in that the former always takes his name from knowledge and is called Musician, while the latter takes his name not from knowledge but from operation — as from Composing he is called Composer; from Singing he is called Singer; and from Playing he is called Player. But more expressly it is understood from those who exercise musical works by hand, who take their name from the work — that is, from the instrument — and not from knowledge: as the Organist from the Organ, the Citharist from the Cithara, the Lyrist from the Lyre; and similarly every other, according to the sort of instrument he plays.

Therefore whoever will wish to examine the matter well will find the difference between the one and the other to be as great as their office and end are diverse. Whence wishing to know what the one and the other are, we shall say: the Musician is one who is expert in Music, has the faculty of judging — not by sound but by reason — what is contained in such a science; who, if he will give attention to things pertaining to practice, will make his knowledge more perfect, and will be able to call himself a perfect Musician. But the Practitioner — whether Composer, Singer, or Player — we shall say to be one who learns the precepts of the Musician through long exercise and brings them to effect with the voice or by means of whatever artificial instrument.

The Practical Musician and the Perfect Musician

So that Practical may be called every composer who knows how to compose some musical melody not by reason and knowledge but by long use; every player of whatever sort of musical instrument who knows how to play solely by long use and judgment of ear — even though neither the one nor the other arrives at such use without the means of some knowledge. And the swiftness of the hands, of the tongue, and every movement, and every other fair accident found in the player or singer, must be attributed to use and not to knowledge — for since knowledge consists in cognition alone, if it were otherwise it would follow that he who had greater cognition of the science would also be more apt to exercise it, whereas in fact one sees the contrary.

Now having seen the difference found between the one and the other — that it is the same as that between the craftsman and the instrument which, being governed and directed by the craftsman, is so much less worthy of him as the one who governs is more noble than the thing governed — we could almost say the Musician to be more worthy than the Composer, Singer, or Player, as the former is more noble and worthy than the instrument. But I do not say thereby that the composer and anyone who exercises the natural or artificial instruments is or ought to be deprived of this name, provided that he knows and understands what he operates, and renders fitting reason for all of it — for to such a person the name not only of Composer, of Singer, or of Player, but of Musician as well is fitting.

Indeed if with a single name we had to call him, we would call him a Perfect Musician: for giving attention and exercising himself in both of those named, he will possess Music perfectly — which I desire and hope will be acquired by those who shall wish to observe our precepts.