Argumentum in Timaeum
Argument of the Timaeus
[Site Editorial Note: The following is a translation of Jean de Serres’s (Joannes Serranus’s) analytical preface to the Timaeus as it appears in the 1578 Henri Estienne edition of Platonis opera quae extant omnia, Tomus Tertius, pp. 3–11 (PDF pp. 17–25). Serrani’s preface is a work of Renaissance Christian humanism: he reads Plato through a Calvinist theological lens, admires the dialogue’s speculative reach, and corrects what he takes to be its errors against Scripture. His structural summary of the dialogue’s argument is the primary scholarly value of this text for L’Harmonicht. Greek phrases from the original are retained in brackets where Serrani quotes Plato directly.]
Preface to the Fifth Syzygy
The introduction to this fifth Syzygy, which encompasses a doctrine as beautiful as it is obscure and entangled in the greatest difficulties, requires us to repeat what we prefaced at the very beginning of the whole series of writings: namely, that we must take care above all in these discussions to avoid two extremes — lest, carried away by our eager desire for the most beautiful kind of knowledge, we be captured by the allurements of pagan sirens, that is, filled with the prejudices of false opinions; or lest, in our effort to avoid these rocks of error, we adopt remedies for softening them by interpreting the opinions of philosophers too accommodatingly, putting on the mask of another altogether and transforming the truth, attributing to them things they never so much as thought of, and even doing violence to genuine truth. The former is the most foolish course, the latter the most wicked. For we ought not to read the writings of pagan philosophers in order to seek knowledge of truth from them as from its sources, but so that we may perceive how far human reason progresses in knowledge of God, virtue, and eternal life — namely, this far: that men are apomachoi [fighters at a distance], from the light of that natural knowledge which shines amid the great darkness of corruption in which the human race is entirely enveloped. Yet if that light has shone anywhere in a pagan and shadowy man, it has surely shone in Plato, in whom nevertheless the greatest and most dangerous shadows are also present. But a certain reasonable method must be found by which we can move safely among this kind of writing, so that the reading of those authors may not only be not useless but genuinely fruitful. This method seems to me the most secure rule for advancing toward a certain and fruitful knowledge of philosophical doctrine: that, applying the diligence of careful judgment, we prudently consider what they say; that we eagerly embrace whatever traces of the primal truth appear; and that from this same source we detect and convict the falsehood — for falsehood will be whatever departs from the truth, since truth is always self-consistent. Now that will count as truth in the philosophers which comes closest to the doctrine contained in the sacred books of Scripture, which is the one and certain truth and genuine philosophy. Whatever therefore either clearly agrees with it, or belongs to the first principles of truth, is true.
These primal traces of truth in the philosophers are therefore to be diligently observed — and indeed not a few are found among them, yet how absurdly they fail in the middle of the road! How inept are the conclusions they draw from good principles! In convicting the falsehood of which, since it abounds among them, we must deal with them as they themselves profess about themselves: for they do not claim to possess the truth, but only its traces, as much as can fall to man’s lot, and by a kind of counterfeit reasoning [adulterina quadam ratione] fashioned and formed from it — they confess that they need some divine utterance by which they may be led to the truth, which they declare they will embrace willingly if anyone demonstrates it and teaches them better things. On this very dark topic, Plato throughout implores the help of God, that He might serve as guide through these difficult labyrinths. What then should we do here? Let us appeal from the philosophers to the philosophers themselves, oppose to them those traces of truth that will appear in them, and detect the falsehood from the same source, when the philosophers contradict themselves — since truth, as I have said, is one and always self-consistent. But enough of this here. In this argument I have endeavoured to bring the force of that rule to practical application: I have cleared away the itch of mysteries, with which interpreters are wondrously titillated so that they heap intolerable darkness upon darkness that is already intolerable enough; I have explained the matter clearly and simply as much as I could; I have turned away from new mysteries; with the notes of aphoristic indication I have pointed out the aim and akribeia [precision] of the disputation; I have tried to grasp the sum of the doctrine in distinct articles, so that the free and purer judgment of the good and prudent reader might be left to him. These are the things that needed to be said by way of preface to the beginning of this most obscure disputation, under which I have subsumed Physics and Metaphysics, concerning whose order and sequence something must be said first, in the general way that is my custom, so that thereafter I may assign to each its own proper argument.
Ethics, Physics, and Metaphysics: The Order of the Dialogues
We have placed Physics and Metaphysics after Ethics and Politics, following the order indicated by Plato and his own method. For he holds that the first study of men should be to compose themselves with good character, to govern their households prudently, and to be active in public life as befits a good and prudent citizen, before they proceed to the investigation of nature — which without a solid and sober knowledge of civil life is vain and unfruitful [akarpos]. Then we have joined Physics and Metaphysics, that is, theology, following also the authority of our philosopher, which itself rests on true reason: for it cannot be that we may fruitfully know Nature unless the craftsman and lord of Nature has first been understood, nor that we may earnestly come to know the marvels of Nature if we do not know ourselves — that is, our own soul and its condition after this mortal and fleeting life.
These two are the heads of Platonic theology: knowledge of God and knowledge of Man. The chief and primary end of our whole life is certainly to know God; the secondary, to know ourselves. From this ordering I have arranged these dialogues thus: We gave the Timaeus the first place, because it encompassed both those heads of Metaphysics and the most exquisite summary of the whole of Physics. Timaeus Locrus, written in Doric, is either a summary of it, or an epitome, or rather an autograph — from which, as from a fountain, Plato derived that most copious disputation and illustrated it with commentary. The Critias is an illustration of the proem of the Timaeus, concerning the history of the primeval world, which serves him as an approach to the history of the creation of the world: as we shall say in its proper place. The Parmenides deals with the causes of things — that is, with God, the primary and omnipotent cause of all things — and with natural causes, which God both created and makes efficacious as He wills. The Symposium is wholly occupied with explaining that force which God has planted in all things by which they preserve themselves, and in particular with the appetite of the human soul — whether good or bad — which is most potent in moving to action, since it is the principle of action in man: so it is in part physike and in part ethike, as we shall explain. The Phaedrus is wholly concerned with demonstrating the condition of the human soul and its faculties, insofar as it is beautiful and insofar as it is deformed, as virtue or vice accedes to it — so it belongs to the second part of the theological programme, concerning the knowledge of Man. The Hippias Minor is in the same argument as the Phaedrus, but what is treated there dramatically is treated here analytically, against the Sophists, who were Plato’s capital enemy. And these things have been said thus far concerning the sequence and order of this Syzygy.
Of the Timaeus in Particular
Aim. The aim or scope of the disputation appears from the very title itself: On the Nature of the Universe. For it encompasses the doctrine and opinion of Plato concerning the nature of things, that is, concerning the creation of the Universe and all its parts, their causes, and their powers. Thus the subject of the disputation is the explanation of Physics. The philosopher teaches by what principle and origin the Universe and its individual parts have both come to be and now subsist and are preserved, and by what power and virtue — namely, that the world was created by God and is powerfully held together by that same power and efficacy with which He created and established it, through the natural causes created and ordered by Him to that end. Hence, the world has not come to be spontaneously, without any preceding cause, nor by itself, as eternal: but it has begun to exist at a certain beginning, by the certain decree and efficacious power of God, who delineated in His own mind the image of the world and at the appointed time created and established it, so that it should exist in a certain firm and definite mode. He further explains the marvellous power of Nature, its forces and effects; for he teaches that it was created by God, and that Time too — the first of all created things — was created by that same architect, so that the foundations of profane philosophy, which holds the world eternal by reason of the eternity of time, to the reproach of the craftsman, may be shaken. He sets out therefore the causes of Nature, which he teaches to be the primary ministers of God, and to have received certain distinct tasks at the command and direction of the craftsman: for Nature operates by the power of the commanding sovereign, and, as he says, [like a well-ordered city following its ruler’s word]. These are the words used by Platonists in expounding them: [gracious Nature, minister of the former and servant of the latter divine word, guided by the idea of the former and productive of the latter]; as we shall say in its proper place.
When he has thus explained the power and efficacy of the Universe in general, he then deals individually with Man, the most excellent of all living things and therefore the most important part of the world; and diligently traces his creation, both of body and of soul. Thus the simplest thesis of this disputation is: On Nature, or the Universe of things — that is, concerning its creation, power, and efficacy, its individual parts, and above all Man, the most excellent of its parts. That is why interpreters call it cosmogonikon [pertaining to the generation of the cosmos]. The dialogue is moreover most certainly physikon [physical], for the chief part of the disputation is concerned with explaining Nature; it is also theologikon [theological], for it teaches both the power and might of God the craftsman in creating and preserving the world, and the principles and causes of things, and indeed, if compared with the disputations of other philosophers, does so in the most metaphysical manner, as will be plain from the passages themselves. The aim of the disputation having been indicated — that most copious and splendid one, furnished with the most beautiful store of things — it remains that we note also its sequence, in our customary manner, so that we may understand the akolouthia [logical sequence] and series of each part.
Structure of the Dialogue
Leaving aside freely those new mysteries concerning the triple world — celestial, exemplary, and human — in which order the common run of interpreters say the whole disputation is contained (seeing that in my view they heap intolerable darkness upon darkness), I set down this thesis simply:
The whole dialogue has two parts: the prooimion [Preface], and the akroasis [the main discourse], that is, the treatment of natural things themselves.
The Preface is accommodated to the main subject: for after a long discussion of political matters (of which Socrates recapitulates a certain summary), Plato shows that it is appropriate to proceed to natural things, once the minds of men are imbued with the earnest knowledge of those things necessary for maintaining and cultivating society. Having said this by way of preface, he assigns the role of speaking about natural things to Timaeus of Locri the Pythagorean, most versed in knowledge of such things; and Socrates himself declines the task, since he had bent philosophy toward character and life. For in this disputation he does not teach but listens — Socrates. But so that a convenient and gentle approach to the treatment of Nature might be opened up, he opportunely introduces mention of that ancient and primeval history, which came closest to the cradle and origin of the world: and whose creation is the first head of this disputation.
That account of the Atlantic war, I say, is a simple history; and I cannot approve the opinion of those interpreters who understand all of it anagogically [allegorically] and force the whole doctrine explained subsequently in the disputation into it — which seems to me both inopportune and untrue, since Plato both denies that it is a fabricated fable and explicitly claims it is alethinos logos [a true account], as will be plain from the Critias, in which a splendid exegesis of that history is undertaken as a true history. Now it is true that the whole of that history smells of mythos — that is, of the odour and mustiness of a certain obsolete antiquity, which has given interpreters occasion for allegory. Yet there remain some true traces of archaiology — as when he speaks of a certain universal flood and of many cities before that time, and of human society variously developed and cultivated, concerning which in their proper places. The sum, however, is this: that the Greeks have no memory of true antiquity; and that the origin of true antiquity must be traced from the creation of the Universe; and that the time which came closest to it is to be reckoned as most ancient.
The Main Discourse thus conveniently opens the approach to the legitimate account of the nature of the Universe, whose first creation and origin is investigated, then nature, its conditions, causes, powers, effects — which is the true akroasis [discourse] of nature, which we have established as the subject of this disputation and the second part of the Dialogue; which in turn must be subdivided and explained in distinct particulars. We therefore distribute it into three parts. The First comprises certain hypotheses necessary for the demonstration and understanding of the projected argument — just as the true laws of lawgiving demand, which can only consist of certain antecedents. This Plato calls prooimion [prelude], and the remaining disputation nomos [law] — an elegant manner of speaking, by which he signifies that those hypotheses were laid as the foundation, as it were, of a legitimate law to be enacted. The Second teaches the causes and manner of the creation of the Universe — that is, by whom, from what, and how. The Third is the copious and accurate exegeseis [exposition] of that most beautiful doctrine.
The Seven Hypotheses
Before treating of the most serious matter, he first implores the help and assistance of God; and teaches what he is about to say and in what order he will proceed — concerning the creation and nature of the Universe and of Man. Thus he lays down seven hypotheses:
I. There is something that always is and has no origin; and something that is always becoming and never truly is. That is: [the one, truly real and eternal; the other, generated and never truly existent].
II. That which truly is, is comprehended by intellect and reason; that which becomes, is perceived by opinion together with a certain non-rational sense.
III. That which truly exists always has the same mode of being; but that which is generated, comes to be and passes away, and never truly exists — that is, [it is truly in flux and never standing still].
IV. Whatever comes to be necessarily comes to be from some cause.
V. There are two exemplars to which the craftsman of the Universe — that is, the Demiurge, God, the father and king of all — looked while creating things: one eternal and unchanging, the other generated and subject to generation and alteration.
VI. That craftsman of the Universe did not act rashly, but with a certain boulesis [intention of mind] which he had represented in his mind from eternity the image of the work he wished to produce, from which the things themselves were born and truly came to be at the appointed time.
VII. Some things are created for an eternal archetype; others, for a generated one. The Universe itself, or the world, or heaven (for these are synonymous in this argument), was created for the eternal exemplar; singular things, for the generated one.
The First Part: Causes and Creation of the Universe
Acting upon this, he proceeds to the nomos [legitimate discourse] itself — the legitimate treatment of the akroasis [main discourse], which we said consists of two further parts. Concerning the first, in the first place: which teaches the cause and manner of the constitution of the Universe. By cause I mean the very proegoumene arche [principal source]: which I plainly distinguish from natural causes, which act in their own manner, but not as causes properly and in themselves, but as co-causes, [what Plato calls concauses]. We shall speak of those natural causes — whether they be archai or stoicheia — in their proper place. Now, concerning the true principle or true cause of the Universe, which for him is, to say it in one word, GOD THE CRAFTSMAN. I know that the common run of interpreters teaches differently — that there are three principles of things according to Plato’s opinion: God, Matter, and Idea. Which I do not deny; but whether the true meaning of this most difficult Platonic opinion can be better comprehended in the manner I indicate, let the learned judge, after accurately examining all the parts and circumstances of the whole discourse.
These things, he declares, are in God the craftsman: the End, the Idea, and the Exemplar — the plan for the future work. The Idea is the eternal divine decree and providence concerning the creation of the world, conjoined with the omnipotent wisdom and virtue of God. The End — that Good which God sets before Himself in that eternal decree. The Exemplar or Image is the delineation of the future work from the force and efficacy of that eternal decree — which is in one sense single in the mind of the craftsman, yet is said to be double in different respects, from the nature of things that come to exist: one [kata to aei on] [according to that which always is], and sempiternal; the other [genneton kai reuston] [generated and flowing], which never truly is but changes continually.
From the double nature of the Exemplar, a double nature of things has come about: some sempiternal — the Universe itself, which he also for this cause calls eikona toU noetou, theon aistheton, megiston kai ariston, kalliston kai teleiotaton kai monogene [the image of the intelligible, the sensible god, the greatest and best, most beautiful and most perfect, and only-begotten]. But he says that it was created, and he often insists on this. Now the words at the beginning of the disputation are explicit: “Whether has the world always existed, having no origin, or has it come to be, having begun from some beginning? It has come to be.” And it would be importunate and superfluous to heap up such passages bearing witness to the generation of the world, since it is as frequent as it could be. Yet concerning the final dissolution of the world, Plato says this: [Time is coterminous with the sky, which came to be together with it, and will be dissolved together with it, should the craftsman ever wish to dissolve it] — though he explains that exception with some qualification. From this it appears that Plato involves himself in a very grave contradiction: for he seems to say openly inconsistent things — now clearly appearing to hold that the world was created, now nevertheless calling it eternal.
The World’s Eternity: A Qualified Account
However, unless there could be elicited from Plato’s own words a solid answer to that doubt, it would be easy enough to reply: that it is not at all wonderful that this man contradicts himself in such great mysteries of truth, of which he has seen not the light itself but only some sparks amid darkness. Yet there certainly seem to be other true and proper responses, which, while they cannot wholly free Plato from zetemia [censure], at least can do so from zetema [the charge], so that this opinion remains firm and certain for him — that the world was created — and therefore, since it began at some beginning, is by no means eternal.
Plato calls the world eternal in three respects. First: if the eternal decree of God concerning the creation of the world is considered — for the world may be called eternal in this sense, insofar as the eternal decree of creation was eternal in the mind of God. Second: Plato also calls the world eternal comparatively — that is, firm and constant in comparison with all those things that are perpetually affected by various flux and change back and forth: such as all singular things, and especially living creatures, which seem to be the sport of all changes. For the mass of the Universe persists and endures, while not only men change in various ways but even the very face of the earth is itself altered by the vicissitudes of cities and kingdoms and by its own near-alteration. The Universe therefore in comparison with its members seems in this way to have a certain eternity. Heaven in particular displays an illustrious monument of this constancy, having great authority and power over inferior things — and hence it is also called monoeidikon, or as interpreters say, [gathering all things under its embrace]. Third: Plato calls the world eternal not from its own nature but from God’s counsel and will — that is, for as long as God shall will the world to subsist. And so when Plato said the world would be dissolved and would perish, he immediately adds the explanation: [unless he whom it was unlawful to dissolve were to will it]. And elsewhere he explains what that lysis is, introducing the one supreme God addressing those superior realities He had created, and granting them authority over inferior things.
First Matter and the Receptacle
In the Second Part — the causes and manner of the creation of the Universe — Plato teaches the cause and manner in which the Universe was established, saying that it consists of body and soul, and indeed that it is a perfect zōon [living creature]. For what falls under the senses — fire, earth, and whatever can be seen with the eyes — is body; but body cannot subsist without soul. He calls soul that marvellous symmetria and analogia [proportion] by which all things within the embrace of the Universe are preserved. He then teaches this and illustrates it with a diagram drawn from the discipline of mathematicians — a method of teaching which in those learned schools could not have been more luminous; but in our age, by reason of ignorance of mathematics, the hypomnemata [demonstrations] are formidable, by pretext of which the ignorant are deterred from the teaching of the most august philosopher, and the captious sophists have seized the occasion to expel Plato from the schools, crying that he is stuffed with Pythagorean numbers. A worthy retribution indeed against Plato, who once barred the ungeometrized from the entrance of his school! Such are the vicissitudes of the times.
Concerning the creation of the world from that matter — Plato teaches that GOD formed this Universe [ektaseōs eis taxin agagōn ex ataxias], that is, bringing it from disorder into order with a certain prudent persuasion of Mind. And so God fashioned the world according to the image of His own Idea, by its force and efficacy.
How far purer and brighter is the history of the primal truth! He spoke, and it was done. For the eternal Wisdom of God then began to appear (whence it both is and is called Logos) when He began to speak as God; [gracious and efficacious Word of God, giving real existence to things by His sovereign commands].
He continues to explain what that dēmiourgeia [craftsmanship] was. First he teaches that four Elements were created — which he also calls [the ones and the others], Water, Air, Fire, Earth. He describes their analogia [analogy of generation], using a diagram. Then their motions, the energeiai [activities], the pathēmata [conditions], and how some coalesce with others — their powers and properties. Then he applies the doctrine of the Elements to the individual things composed from the elements, teaching their force especially in man, the most excellent of all created things, tracing through his individual members their marvellous oikodomiā [architecture], powers, and ministries, copiously. He deals separately with the Soul and the Body of Man, teaches the faculties and energeiai of the soul. And from that symbiōsis [cohabitation] of soul with body he demonstrates that diseases insinuate themselves into the soul, just as an imbalance of humours flows into the body. Thus with the diseases of both indicated, he shows the sources of remedies — first the methods of healing the body, then the soul; and also describes the condition of the soul in the second life, explaining at greater length those most frivolous fooleries drawn from the miry pits of the Pythagoreans: concerning purgations of the soul, concerning the circles of the second life — which are paralogisms of human reason vanishing into thin air, drawing false and insolent conclusions from good principles. Good are the principles: that souls persist after death; and that bodies will rise again. These however they contaminated with their errors.
The Third Part: Exposition of All Things
Finally, he imposes a conclusion on this most copious disputation, recalling its sum To the Universe and its Parts — as he had proposed at the beginning (which seems the simplest division of this physike akroasis), in which may be noted the sources of physical akroaseis: concerning principles, causes, elements, meteors, the soul, bodily affections, the senses and their faculties, etc. We have endeavoured to indicate these perspicuously in our aphoristic notes and briefly, as befits this kind of writing; as indeed in this argument we have purposely omitted very much that we know to have been treated copiously by most learned men both old and recent; but it had to be seen how far, in this kind of writing in which our purpose is to indicate a simple interpretation, we should go. We shall treat the matter more freely on another occasion, should God grant it, in a commentary specially devoted to this work.
Of this most copious disputation we have endeavoured to set forth a certain summary graphikōs [by way of diagram], the infinite material of things being left to the judgment and diligence of the learned reader, who will consult these few things in good part — drawn from the richest treasury, so that the occasion of inspecting that treasury more accurately may be offered.
Summary of Physics and Metaphysics: The Hypotheses
[Serrani’s aphoristic summary follows, setting out the principal theses in numbered propositions across two columns. The translation below renders the full text of these scholia as continuous numbered propositions.]
1. There is something that always is and has no origin; and something that is always becoming and never truly is — that is, the former is truly real [to on] and the latter generated and never genuinely existent.
2. From this hypothesis is drawn the distinction of God the craftsman, who alone truly is, [aei on kai aition kai monon akinetion] [always being and the cause and alone immovable] — and is therefore one truly eternal. Aionion is taken in two senses: aionion properly and primarily, that is, aei on kai aei parmon [always being and always present] and atreptos kai akinetos [unchangeable and unmovable], which belongs to God alone and in no way applies to created things; and aionion in another sense, from the craftsman’s own will — as are the Angels and the souls of men. Concerning the world and natural causes by which the world is sustained, we shall shortly show in what respect this is said.
3. The nature of generated things is not one but various and manifold: some have a more constant and stable nature from the craftsman’s will — such as Angels, souls of men. Concerning the world and natural causes, inasmuch as compared with inferior things, those superior ones seem to have a certain precarious eternity [ex boulēsin aïdion] — that is, as Plato says in the Politicus: [they seem to have a kind of precarious eternity from the craftsman’s will] — yet they are not truly eternal, since they came into existence at a certain beginning by the craftsman’s command, and when the craftsman wills it they will cease.
4. Whatever is made necessarily comes to be from some cause. This Universe and whatever is contained within its embrace did not come to be by itself or rashly, but by the craftsman’s power and art — [dēmiourgos ōn kai patēr tou holou] [being craftsman and father of the whole].
5. Among things of a firm and constant nature there ought also to be a firm and certain treatment; but we all, wrapped as we are in this body like people in a dream, can scarcely perceive the true images of those things; and therefore we ought to speak of them as far as we can — that is, to give them discourses consonant with those things, and not investigate their mysteries more curiously than is permitted.
6. To the creation of this Universe, these things must be distinctly recognised in the mind of God: the best End for the creation of that beautiful work; the Idea, that is, the eternal decree and wisdom; the Exemplar or image of the future world — which contains both the Matter and the Form of the world, which God found within Himself and did not take from outside.
7. God in His own time — that is, when He Himself willed it — created the Universe itself with all its members and parts and the order of all natural causes.
8. GOD OMNIPOTENT AND ENTIRELY GOOD, WISE, and excellent is the one and true [to on kai aition kai monon akinēton] [being, cause, and alone unmoved] — the one true principle of natural things, although Nature also has its principles.
9. A distinction must therefore be drawn between God and Nature: which indeed acts from principles, but God has created both the Universe itself and all its causes; and in this sense Nature itself is efficacious, insofar as God has willed it to be so: Nature itself is minister, God is craftsman and lord.
10. Whatever is in God is eternal: insofar as His relation to us comes through a wonderful order of wisdom acting prudently. This ought to be noted and designated by us.
11. In every work being accomplished, two things concur: Matter and Form — matter is laid as the foundation, form is brought into matter. Thus God in the making of the world conjoined Matter and Form; but with so great a difference from the human craftsman’s procedure as is the difference between God and man. For God both created Matter and Form from Himself; men take them from without.
12. That Matter is described as follows: [chōra kai hedra kai mētēr kai tithēnē pantōn] [Space and seat and mother and nurse of all things] — and [Ov ti kai genesis kai ousia] [both what-it-is and becoming and being], namely, the seat and receptacle and matter and nurse of all things. And what it is — the seat and generation, distributed trifariously in those three properties, before Heaven existed. He calls it nurse because it diffuses its efficacious power into all things.
13. The conditions of that first matter are these: [amorpha kai aneidea kai amorphos kai planomenē] [shapeless and formless and wandering], receiving all forms, since it has no fixed form. [It is as if nought, yet potentially is], as Aristotle explains. A trace of Mosaic truth is what he calls it vast and empty. The ancients also called it Chaos — a rude, indigested, confused mass; also [eikōn] — dark and shadowy: [like formless matter not yet circumvested with substantial forms] — for first matter does not fall under the eyes, yet it pervades all bodily things, the mother and foundation of all sensible things, variously poised and shaken, receiving various forms, from which God fashioned the Universe.
14. From that matter God created all things; and it itself was the first of things to be created.
15. God did not rashly impose Form upon that matter, but with the best end proposed to Himself also the best energeia [activity].
16. In the mind of God, therefore, the principal and governing cause of the work was the [hekousion boulema] [voluntary intention]: from which the Idea — that is, the eternal decree to the fulfilling of that end — arose. And He delineated for Himself the archidēigma [archetype] of the future work, diverse and multiple according to the various nature of things — namely, one is [to aei on kai monoeides] [the always-being and uniform], the other [gennēton kai reuston].
17. These things concurred in the mind of God: the [boulēma], the [Idea], the [archidēigma]. The material was: the Nature of Things, and the power of Natural Causes — all of these created by God.
18. All these things are eternal in God, since the decree of the creation of the world is eternal; and by reason of this, that matter, as the form of the world, itself and the world itself are [kata ti aïdia] [in a certain sense eternal].
19. The world is eternal insofar as the decree of the creation of the world was eternal in God, and accordingly the world existed in that eternal decree just as it truly came to be at its own time.
20. Thus the true principle of all created things is God the craftsman: in whose [proegoumenos logos] [governing word]. But in His mind, for this creation of the Universe, these things must be distinctly recognised: the best End for the beautiful work; the Idea, that is, the eternal decree and wisdom; the Exemplar or image of the future world, which contains both the Matter and Form of the world, which God found within Himself, not taking them from without.
21. God in His own time — that is, when He Himself willed it — created the Universe itself with all its members and parts and the order of all natural causes.
[The aphoristic summary continues with propositions concerning natural causes, the four elements, the structure of the cosmos, the soul of the Universe, and the creation of Man. These are rendered here from the two-column layout of the original printed edition.]
Concerning Natural Causes
22. Nature therefore is not the craftsman but the work of God in the Universe; the first natural causes are to be considered in it.
23. What is visible and tangible — that is, not the whole Universe — is body; what is that thing which truly is. And body cannot subsist without soul. Hence the Universe also has its soul, in its own manner. The Universe therefore consists of body and soul.
24. The soul of the Universe is the [analogia] — the universal sympatheia — that wonderful bond of harmony by which the things within the Universe that are mutually contrary are coupled in a certain discord of concord: this Plato calls the soul of the world; and nous [mind], that is, the analogia or the beauty of harmonic proportion, which seems in a manner to rest upon reason.
25. Nature therefore acts prudently and from the power and order of created causes, embracing all motions — is in this [sympatheia], in the motive world, the principle and source of all.
26. That [analogia], equally as the corporeal mass of the Universe, God created.
27. There are in created things: Matter, Form, and Privation — as Aristotle correctly added.
28. Some things are not properly [archia] [principles] themselves but take their constitution from external and alien operation — namely, that [analogia] which we call the Soul of the World.
29. They are thus described: [gē kai hidra, kai genesis kai ousia kai mētēr kai tithēnē] [earth and seat and generation and being and mother and nurse] — namely, that Nature, the [analogia] or marvellous [symphonia], the principal minister: in body, the Elements from which things are constituted.
30. Those causes do not act rashly but with certain and explored knowledge, and govern nature; and whatever is done, is done from some cause, as was said above.
31. Although created by God, they have nonetheless received from God authority to create the bodies of living creatures and to govern those bodies: as the ancient axiom goes, Sol et homo generant hominem [The sun and man generate man].
32. God the craftsman has reserved to Himself the authority to create souls: so that, although the soul is conjoined with the body, those secondary causes have no power over it, since they are ministers only [for the weaving of the body together, not for governing the soul].
33. Divine indeed seems that power of natural causes over inferior things, by reason of their great constancy and near-immortal duration when compared with inferior things.
34. Whatever power and authority they have, they hold precariously, from the craftsman’s will. It is therefore impious to confuse the craftsman with created things and wrongly to attribute to those secondary causes the name of gods, which are works and have had a beginning and will have an end when the craftsman wills it.
35. Time is not properly a natural cause but a necessary condition of causes. For whatever happens in nature happens in time.
36. Heaven is the measure of time in this natural [sympatheia] — but lest impiety thereby infer the eternity of heaven, it is established that Time was created together with heaven, so that being born together they may also be dissolved together when the craftsman wills it.
Concerning the Universe and Its Parts
37. There is only one world, not several worlds. Concerning body and soul of the world, by which it is itself maintained, we said this at proposition 22 — which must nonetheless be repeated here. The Universe therefore consists of body and soul.
38. The Universe is a perfect living creature [zōion teleion]; because whatever happens in the Universe happens thus from that cause and from the proportional harmony of causes, and the Universe is constituted and persists by certain order.
39. All those causes, of which we spoke at proposition 26, are referred to the Universe.
40. The Universe into superior and inferior things; among which heaven holds the most excellent place and has the greatest authority. But to that superior thing, by a certain plan, all things conspire. Elements constituted by it; which are [kai dia ta koinōnia]; nature of the compound is preserved by their harmony. And these things concerning the Elements in general; next individually, so that the use of this general doctrine may be shown.
41. The Elements are the corporeal parts of the Universe.
42. The natures of living things are species; and also of inanimate things which are themselves contained in the Universe.
43. Man is the best and most excellent of all living things and as it were [prōtokosmion] [the first of the cosmos]: since he holds the dominion even of things themselves and of living creatures: the chief part of the Universe.
Concerning Mixed Imperfect Things
44. Four are the Elements: Fire, Earth, Water, Air — and these four are the primary bodies, that is, the stoicheia [elements] from which all things are made.
45. The craftsman first drew forth those Elements from the confused matter and thus distinguished and fitted them, so that each kind is defined by its own faculties standing per se in the Universe itself in its own place.
46. These are the qualities of the Elements: Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry; and Light, Heavy — the former primary, the latter secondary.
47. From their forms and syzygia [combinations] the analogia [proportion] of the elements is perceived.
48. The Elements are plainly contrary to each other; so that they require a third [synapton] [bond] to bind them — which is that discordant concord and concordant discord which God has implanted in things themselves.
49. The Elements therefore mingle with one another and are mutually generated from one another.
50. These are the forms of the Elements: Fire, most agile; hence Plato applies to it the pyramidal figure. Earth, heavy and immovable; hence he assigns it the cubical figure. Air, of middle nature, thin and mobile; he assigns it the octahedron. Water, heavier than air and more diffuse; hence he adapts the icosahedron.
51. These properties also the philosopher traces more copiously, using descriptions which are to be sought from the text itself.
52. In that mixture of elements and their syzygia the analogia of elements appears — yet the sunkritoi [compounds] bear the mark of whichever element dominates.
53. Various and manifold indeed is the motion of the elements: from which they are variously interchanged, altered, and dissolved. Yet there is a certain rest of the elements, both in the Universe and in the synthesis [composition] of bodies.
54. The cause of that rest is the isonomia [equality of balance] of the elements — when they are in their proper place and equilibrate among themselves in bodies.
55. What is solid fit for the fire of nature consists of the nature of fire: most tenuous and most mobile; hence the pyramidal shape is accommodated to it: but in the most thin and subtle — so that it reaches even [kata to aistheton] [to the perceptible]; these its pathē not plainly to be heard, as Ferrini notes on the preceding edition.
56. Duplex also the genus of Air: one [aerogen]; the other, purest and brightest — the Ether, named so. And the inferior air which surrounds us.
57. Duplex also the genus of Water: one, humid and thin — as the water that flows through the earth, [hydor] or [hygron]; the other, fusible, [chytos] or [pēkton]. Such is the sap from earth, with vapour and moisture raised — as we say.
58. The genus of Earth also is various in form; and in some it mixes with others, yet they bear [sunkritoi] — the mark of whichever element dominates — and so each according to its own species.
59. The various properties of the primary qualities in the composite body, which appear even in the mixed, yet bear the mark of the element that dominates. But it is stated here what those species are, as Ferrini notes.
60. In the varied motion of those elements from which they mutually change and are altered and dissolved — yet there is a certain rest, and in the Universe and in the synthesis of bodies.
Concerning the Human Being
61. Man is the most excellent of all living creatures, [diogenes] indeed, since God has granted him a divine soul. In man therefore a double nature exists, mortal and immortal: the mortal, in a bodily mortal instrument; the immortal in a divine one — in which is the to theion [the divine]: that excellence which exempts him from the number of other living creatures.
62. The human being is of two kinds: Male and Female — both truly the work of God, participants of the same reason.
63. By a marvellous and august craftsmanship, God conjoined in the one human being two things utterly contrary, Body and Soul — from which two natures the one man is made; which indeed God knows how to separate and dissolve, and when He wills it can: so that each may return to its own principles — body to the elements from which it is composed; soul to heaven. If it has lived well in this conjunction with the body, it may there live a sempiternal and happy life.
64. Of both those natures therefore, of body and soul, from which man is composed, the diverse condition must be diligently considered.
65. God creates the immortal and divine soul by Himself, without any ministry of secondary causes, in His own image. But the creation of the body He gave to secondary causes — or rather He Himself [tethemeliōmenos kata physin]: in an improper and imprecise way of speaking, when he says that the lesser gods — that is, natural causes — were given power by the supreme God to create bodies.
66. He traces the marvellous architecture of the body individually — of the head, heart, lung, liver, belly, intestines, bones, marrow, nerves, muscles, vertebrae, skin, hair, respiration, blood, etc. — their causes, powers, faculties, and the most excellent and marvellous use of that craftsmanship, which the studious reader will seek individually from the text itself.
67. The rationale of nutrition is copiously explained.
68. The other conditions of the body also — old age, death — their causes and species, and remedies, he teaches.
69. Concerning death also, and its particular accompaniments. And these things concerning the body.
70. The most excellent and truly philosophical knowledge is concerning the soul: and this is the chief end here — that the august power of the craftsman may be perceived and celebrated through it.
71. The soul is one, not several, in the human being.
72. The soul however has several faculties: by which indeed the one soul’s organa [instruments] man lives, and perceives, and uses reason — yet in a diverse manner.
73. Some of those faculties of the soul are bodily and plainly perish with the body; and as long as that [synthesis] of body and soul which constitutes man subsists, they are the ministers of reason — which uses those instruments to exercise its own powers. Those indeed by nature are subject, from the formula of creation: but falsely is it attributed to them that they are [alogoi] [irrational], inasmuch as they are other than reason — since, if they have heard the command of reason, they conform usefully to the formula of honesty and virtue.
74. These are the primary appetites: Pleasure, Pain, Hope, Fear, Boldness, Anger, Love, etc.
75. Over all these, queen and mistress is MIND or REASON, the peculiar gift of God, attributed to man alone among all living creatures: truly immortal and divine.
76. This has its seat in the Head, as in a citadel, obtaining a certain supreme authority over the inferior parts of the soul, from which it is also distinguished by a certain isthmus and boundary, and is secured by a firm guard.
77. The remaining faculties of the soul, having obtained their proper seats in the body, below the head: the irascible dwells in the Heart, the place nearest to reason, so that [the appetite may be led to what decorum commands]. The appetitive, in the Liver, etc.
78. Those inferior faculties of the soul, bound to the body, contract a stain and a fall from it, frequently disobeying the authority of reason. Indeed reason itself is sometimes led away by the impulse and error of those appetites, entangled in the crude senses of the body: so that it not only grows dull but is extinguished, and loses that divine vigour, and headlong falls into evil.
79. Those corruptions are the diseases of the soul: concerning the remedies of which Plato also deals here.
80. The condition of the soul after this mortal life is therefore double, in that second life. If it has led this life well and in virtue, it will enjoy happiness in the second; if badly and viciously, misery: receiving the fitting reward and punishment of the life it has led.
Certain more Notable Flaws in this Disputation
101. True it is that the nature of Man is more excellent than that of woman; but false that women are souls [added to the inferior and ignoble]: and likewise that, as Plato improperly says, from the unworthy race of cowardly and corrupt men, by transmigration of souls — since God has created both sexes equally with dignity and as participants of the same reason, as Plato himself expressly acknowledges.
102. False and foolish is what is said of men’s transformation into the nature of women.
103. True it is that no one is voluntarily evil — but false that it is within the power and authority of each whether to act well or badly. Since our will also is corrupt, and all the faculties of the soul have been corrupted by sin, and we both will and do evil, since our corrupt nature is corrupted. Which however Plato did not rightly understand — namely, the innate infection of sin from the original parent, not from creation but from the corruption of creation, which is nonetheless transmitted hereditarily; and the perverse customs by which new corruptions daily grow upon the native corruption — that is, paranomia and akrasia [lawlessness and incontinence].
104. Those corruptions are the diseases of the soul: concerning the remedies of which Plato also deals here.
105. In all things and in the greatest as in the smallest the help of God is to be implored.
106. The Greeks were ignorant of true antiquity.
107. There was a great flood before whose time the earth was variously settled with cities.
108. The confession of Plato concerning not sufficiently correctly explored truth.
109. The confession to him that [apeiria] [inexperience] is opposed to all true reason — that is, to posit several Gods and [to eisthikōs], and thus to embrace them, impelled by the authority of fathers and the severity of laws — not by reason.
Certain Notable Flaws to Be Noted and Avoided in this Disputation
110. True it is that human nature is more excellent [added: of soul and body] than those of other living creatures — but false that Females are [alogoi] [irrational], since it is established that God created both sexes as participants of the same reason and dignity, and endowed them with the same humanity and mutual affection.
111. False that Birds were made from the species of light men, by the same transmigration of souls — since Truth expressly testifies that God created birds from the waters, which are indeed of an aerial nature.
112. On the falsity of those foundations equally false and blasphemous: that souls pass to and fro in certain seasons — which dogma some call metempsōmatōsin or metempsychōsin [transmigration of souls] — though it is indeed true that souls are immortal and persist after the death of the body, and that the same bodies will at the appointed time be restored to life by God.
113. True that the soul is also corrupted and in need of purification; but what Plato says of the purifications of the soul in the second life is utterly foolish — since the Truth teaches the one and true purification of the soul, namely the blood of Christ the Saviour.
114. True that in the second life a befitting punishment will be inflicted corresponding to sins: but portentous is the blasphemy of whatever is said concerning the transmigration of natures; as Plato convicts himself with his own words.
115. False also the attribution of the creation of evil bodies [added: of men] to lesser gods — so that the supreme God may be [aïtios kakōn] [without blame for evils]: since the fault of corruption belongs to sin coming in from without.
116. True that the power of secondary natural causes over inferior things is great and nearly divine; but since those are works of God, it is a crime to confuse the craftsman with His works; and impure it is to call generated gods those secondary causes, which are works and have had a beginning and will have an end when the craftsman wills it. And to show that their exousia [authority] is precarious, the light of nature itself is to be consulted, which Plato calls those secondary causes ministers and servants of God: by whose operation and ministry God makes use; who is [to on aïdion ontos kai tou monon akinetion]. And so to confuse the craftsman with created things is altogether impious; impure it is to call them generated gods.
117. False also that the [demiourgia] [craftsmanship] for creating bodies was given to the lesser gods as [created divinity] — as he improperly and abusively says — so that we plainly understand that metempsomatōsin [transmigration of souls] to be what he elsewhere, speaking of the same matter, calls it expressly: [plainly false and feigned].
118. True that great and nearly divine is the authority and power of secondary causes; but since they are works of God, and it is a crime to confuse the craftsman with His works; impure is [to call generated gods those secondary causes], which are works and have had a beginning and will have an end when the craftsman wills it. Whatever power they have, they hold precariously, from the craftsman’s will.
[The Argumentum concludes with the printed aphoristic summary in two-column format on p. 11 (PDF p. 25) of the edition, which recapitulates in condensed tabular form the propositions concerning Physics and Metaphysics set out above. Serrani closes with the statement that the infinite material of the things set out is left to the judgment and diligence of the learned reader.]